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Introduction 
The perception of increased bank risk-taking has 
raised concerns as to whether changes and 
improvements are needed in our system of regu- 
latory supervision and examination. These con- 
cerns clearly underlie recent proposals for risk- 
based capital standards issued by all three bank 
regulatory agencies-the Federal Reserve Board, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), and the Comptroller of  the Currency--as 
well as proposals by the FDIC and Federal Sav- 
ings and Loan  Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) for 
risk-based deposit insurance premiums. None of 
these approaches has, as yet, been implemented, 
and each is still under active consideration by at 
least one regulatory body. 
As part of an ongoing evaluation of 
the potential effectiveness of various methods of 
controlling bank risk-taking, this paper presents a 
comparison of risk-based capital and risk-based 
deposit insurance premium proposals. Although 
these proposals may appear to represent quite 
different methods of controlling bank risk, the 
results presented below suggest that this need 
not be the case and that, if  implemented prop- 
erly, the two methods can produce a similar level 
of bank risk-taking. 
The paper also suggests that differ- 
ences that exist bemeen the two methods lie not 
in the fact that one controls premiums and the 
other capital levels, but that one prices risk and 
the other sets a risk standard. This is discussed 
informally in section I, while evidence of how 
both a risk-based insurance and risk-based capital 
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system could be implemented using similar mea- 
sures of  risk is presented in the section that 
follows. 
I.  Discussion 
In the current regulatory environment, commer- 
cial banks are subject to a fixed minimum level 
of  primary capital per-dollar of assets and a fxed 
deposit insurance premium per-dollar of domestic 
deposits regardless of  the risk that they present to 
the FDIC. As many critics have pointed out, this 
presents a potential problem of incentives in that 
banks may not bear the full social costs of 
increased risk-taking. Both a risk-based capital 
and risk-based insurance system are designed to 
address this problem by inducing banks to inter- 
nalize the expected costs that their risk-taking 
imposes on the FDIC and society in general.'  The 
programs appear to differ significantly, however, 
in how they attempt to achieve this goal. 
As proposed, a risk-based deposit 
insurance system would explicitly price risk- 
taking behavior on the part of insured banks. 
Periodically, the FDIC would assess the risk 
represented by each bank and charge an insur- 
ance premium reflecting the expected social 
......................................... 
Another objective may be to distribute the costs of risk-taking  1  more equitably across banks even if such differences stem from 
exogenous factors and if issues of  moral hazard and allocative efficiency 
are irrelevant. 
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Risk Variables 
Symbol  Delinition 
KTA  percent ratio of primary capital to  total assets, 
PD90MA  percent ratio of loans more than 90 days past 
due to total assets, 
LNNACCA  percent ratio of nonaccruing loans to total 
assets, 
RENEGA  percent ratio of renegotiated loans to total 
assets, 
NCOFSA  percent ratio of net loan charge-offs (annual- 
ized) to total 
assets, 
NETINCA  percent ratio of net income (annualized) to 
total assets. 
Source: Board of Governors of the  Federal Reserve System. 
TABLE  1 
costs attributable to it.2 Because banks would in 
principle bear the full expected cost of their 
actions, they would either be deterred from 
excessive risk-taking or would pay the full 
expected costs to the FDIC. 
A risk-based capital standard works 
by setting a standard that, by absorbing losses, 
limits the amount of risk an insured bank can im- 
pose on the FDIC, rather than by explicitly pricing 
risk. If  the regulators determine that a bank 
represents a risk above the allowable standard at 
its current level of capital, they would require the 
bank to raise more capital. By adjusting capital 
"buffers,"  regulators can control the size of poten- 
tial losses irrespective of bank behavior. 
The regulator uses information on 
differences in risk-taking behavior across banks to 
require different amounts of capital or co- 
insurance, not to charge different premiums. 
Indeed, since adjustment of the capital buffer is 
used to reduce the risk represented by each bank 
to the same level, it is then appropriate that they 
be charged a flat premium rate.3 Bank risk-taking 
behavior may be deterred because banks would 
recognize that they will incur higher expected 
capital costs, an implicit price, even though banks 
do not face explicit prices for risk. In both 
schemes, overall system risk-taking would be 
reduced because banks would take full account 
If the  FDlC cannot fully assess the ex-ante risk represented by  2  each bank. pehaps because monitoring costs would be exces- 
sive, then the "optimal"  risk premium would also include "penalties" 
over and above the FDIC's estimate of  each bank's expected social cost. 
13 
Assuming the risk-based capital requirement is binding so that no 
institution holds capital in excess of its requirement. 
of the expected consequences of their actions, 
either through explicit insurance premiums or 
implicit prices via higher capital costs. 
Current Proposals on Risk-Based Deposit 
Insurance and Risk-Based Capital 
In recent years, there have been several specific 
proposals made by the federal regulatory agen- 
cies for basing insurance premiums or capital 
requirements on the perceived risk of deposito~ 
institutions. In 1986, for example, the FDIC asked 
for legislation authorizing the adoption of a risk- 
based deposit insurance system and has devel- 
oped a specific proposal for implementing such 
a system. More recently, the Federal Reserve 
Board, in conjunction with the Bank of England 
and with other U.S. banking regulatory authorities 
has published for public comment a proposal for 
risk-based capital requirements. 
The FDIC proposal for risk-based 
deposit insurance utilizes two measures for 
assessing bank risk-taking.* The first measure is 
based on examiner-determined CAMEL  ratings for 
individual commercial banks. CAMEL  ratings, 
which range from 1 through 5 (with 5 represent- 
ing the least healthy bank) are intended to mea- 
sure the bank's capital adequacy (C), asset quality 
(A), management skills (M),  earnings (E), and 
liquidity (L). The FDIC's problem-bank list con- 
sists of all banks with CAMEL  ratings of 4 and 5. 
The second measure of bank risk 
employed in the FDIC proposal is a risk index 
developed by the FDIC that is based on publicly 
available Call Report data. The index is defined as: 
(1)  I =  .818 - .151KTA+  .211PD9OMA+ 
.265LNNACCA+ .177RENEGA+ 
.I51  NCOFSA - .347  NETINC4, 
where all variables are defined in table 1. The 
weights in the index were estimated from histori- 
ical data with a probit model that predicts whether 
or not an individual bank is on the FDIC's problem- 
bank list. The index can be interpreted as provid- 
ing a measure of the likelihood that a bank is a 
problem bank. Banks with higher index values of 
the index are more likely to be problem institu- 
tions and therefore more likely to impose higher 
expected costs on the FDIC. 
Premiums would be assessed, 
under the FDIC proposal, by defining two pre- 
mium classes. Banks having a positive value of 
the risk index and a CAMEL  rating of 3,4,  or 5, 
would be classified as above-normal risk. These 
4 
The  proposal is described in "Risk-Related Program,"  FDlC Dis- 
cussion Paper,  September 20,  1985, and Hirschhom, E.,  "Developing 
a Proposal fw  Risk-Related Deposit  Insurance," Banking and Economic 
Review,  FDIC,  SeptemberIOctober 1986. 
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Summary of Risk Weights and Major Risk Categories for State Member Banks and Bank 
Holding Companies 
Category A1  (0 percent weight) 
Cash-domestic and foreign 
Claims on Federal Reserve Banks 
Category A2  (  10 percent weight) 
Short-term (one year or less) claims on U.S. Government and its Agencies. 
Category A3  (25 percent weight) 
Cash items in process of collection. 
Short-term claims on domestic depository institutions and foreign banks, including foreign 
central banks. 
Claims (including repurchase agreements) collateralized by cash or U.S. Government or 
Agency debt. 
Claims guaranteed by the U.S. Government or its Agencies. 
Local currency claims on foreign central governments to the extent that bank has local cur- 
rency liabilities. 
Federal Reserve Bank stock. 
Category A4  (50 percent weight) 
Claims on U.S. Government-sponsored Agencies. 
Claims (including repurchase agreements) collateralized by U.S. Government-sponsored 
Agency debt. 
General obligation claims on states, counties and municipalities. 
Claims on multinational development institutions in which the U.S. is a shareholder or con- 
tributing member. 
Category A5  (100 percent weight) 
All other assets not specified above, including: 
Claims on private entities and individuals. Long-term claims on domestic and foreign banks. 
All other claims on foreign governments and private obligators. 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
TABLE  2 
institutions would be charged an annual pre- 
mium equal to one-sixth of one percent of 
domestic deposits, or twice the current premium 
level. All other institutions (that is, institutions 
having either a negative value for the risk index 
or a CAMEL rating of 1 or 2) would be classified 
as normal-risk banks and be charged the current 
premium of one-twelfth of one percent. 
The risk-based capital requirement 
proposed by the Federal Reserve Board, in con- 
junction with other regulatory authorities, mea- 
sures bank risk-taking in a somewhat different 
fashion than the FDIC's deposit insurance pro- 
posal. Capital requirements would be assessed, 
under the Board's proposal, as a fraction of the 
on- and off-balance-sheet activity of individual 
commercial banks.5 Specifically, the proposal 
5 
The proposal is described in two press releases of  the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System titled "Capital Mainte- 
nance: Revision to Capital Adequacy Guidelines," dated February 12, 
1987 and March 18,  1987. 
defines five asset categories that are shown in 
table 2. These categories are intended to mea- 
sure, in broad terms, assets having varying 
degrees of credit risk. Cash and claims in Federal 
Reserve Banks (category Al) are deemed to have 
no credit risk and require no capital support. 
Commercial loans to customers other than banks, 
(Category A5) are deemed to have the greatest 
amount of credit risk. The minimum primary cap- 
ital level, i<;  required under the proposal would 
be defined as: 
where a denotes the minimum required ratio (not 
yet specified in the proposal) and A1  to A5 
denote the asset categories defined in table 2. 
The requirement shown in equa- 
tion (2) effectively imposes different minimum 
capital standards on each of the five asset catego- 
ries. If  a is set at 7 percent, for example, all 
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commercial loans, except those to other banks 
(category A5), would effectively  have minimum 
required capital ratios equal to 7 percent; claims 
on U.S. government-sponsored agencies (cate- 
gory 41)  would have required capital ratios equal 
to 1.75 percent; and short-term treasury securities 
(category A2) would have required capital ratios 
of 0.7 percenL6 
It is clear that a major difference 
between the risk-based capital and risk-based 
deposit insurance proposals just described is the 
type of information that is used to assess bank 
risk-taking. The risk-based deposit insurance 
proposal focuses on measures of bank perfor- 
mance, such as earnings and asset quality; the 
risk-based capital proposal focuses on the types 
of activities in which banks are involved. .The 
former view is based on statistical evidence that 
suggests these performance measures provide the 
best forecast of future bank problems? The latter 
approach to measuring bank risk-taking is based 
on the view that certain activities are inherently 
more risky than other activities and that these 
more risky activities should be capitalized at 
higher levels. 
In contrasting the two approaches 
to measuring bank risk, it should be emphasized 
that the different measures used do not represent 
an inherent difference between risk-based capital 
and risk-based insurance. Indeed, both systems 
could, in principle, use identical information in 
assessing the risk of individual banks. The differ- 
ence between the two systems lies not in what 
information the regulator collects, nor in how it 
uses that information to assess bank risk; rather, 
the difference results primarily because one sys- 
tem controls risk by a standard and the other by 
@icitprices.  In the next subsection, we de- 
scribe how these differences affect both banks 
and bank regulators. 
6 
In addition to imposing capital requirements on various balance- 
sheet asset categories, the proposal also addresses the risk from 
off-balance-sheet activities. Capital requirements for those activities are 
determined by first converting the face-amount of  off-balance-sheet 
items to a balance-sheet equivalent. This is done by multiplying the face 
amount of  the off-balance-sheet contract by an  appropriate credit con- 
version factor. The resulting balance-sheet equivalent is then assigned to 
one of  the five risk categories depending on the identity of the obligator 
and, in certain cases, on the maturity of the instrument. 
In addition to the empirical work on predicting problem banks, the  7 literature also suggests that earnings capital and asset quality 
measures are important predictors of  future bank  failure. See  J.  Bovenzi, 
J. Marino, and F.  McFadden, "Commercial Bank Failure Prediction Mod- 
els," in Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of  Atlanta (November 
1983) and Robert B.  Avery, Gerald A. Hanweck and Myron L.  Kwast, 
"An Analysis of Risk-Based Deposit Insurance for Commercial Banks," 
Preceedings  of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (1985), 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Chicago. 
Differences Between Risked-based Capital and 
Risk-based Deposit Insurance 
Because one system is based on a minimum 
standard and the other on a price, a number of 
differences are likely to exist between risk-based 
capital and risk-based insurance. One difference 
is that enforcement of a risk-based capital system 
is likely to offer the regulator more flexibili?y  and 
potential for discretion than a risk-based pre- 
mium system. If  an annual insurance assessment 
appeared on a bank's income statement, and there- 
fore was public, it would be difficult to waive or 
adjust the fee without alerting competing banks, 
financial market participants, and the public. More- 
over, enforcement would likely be very mechani- 
cal. Banks would be assessed a fee, and examin- 
ers would have to deal individually only with 
those banks that could not or would not pay. 
However, enforcement of a risk- 
based capital standard is likely to be of a very dif- 
ferent nature. Enforcement might focus only on 
those firms close to or under the standard, and 
would likely entail more individual examiner 
input. Moreover, the judgement of whether or 
not a bank with a continually changing balance 
sheet meets the standard-and if not, how long it 
has to comply-is likely to offer considerable 
potential for discretion. Thus, in a regulato~ 
environment based on judgement and discre- 
tionary supervision and regulation, a risk-based 
capital standard might be more attractive. 
Another difference is that because 
a risk-based premium system prices risk rather 
than limiting it by forced capital adjustments, it is 
likely to offer bank a morej7exibIe, and there- 
fore potentially more eEcient, means of response. 
Under a risk-based capital system, a risky bank 
facing abnormally high capital costs does not 
have the option of paying the FDIC for the right 
to take excessive portfolio risk even though this 
may be its most cost-effective resp~nse.~  This fea- 
ture is likely to favor a risk-based premium 
approach under virtually all regulatory environ- 
ments. It might be argued that banks should not 
be allowed too much freedom as they may not 
properly respond to prices. However, this could 
be accommodated in a risk-based premium sys- 
tem by shutting down banks with excessive risk- 
taking or by altering their behavior by other 
supervisory means. 
The two proposals are.also  likely 
to have significant differences in the amount of 
information that they reveal to the public. At 
......................................... 
8 
Technically, raising capital is not the only adjustment available to 
the bank as it can adjust any factor used in the regulator's 
assessment of risk. Thus, the relevant price banks face is the price of 
the minimum-cost method of  meeting the standard. If this price is not 
equal to the regulator's price, there will be an inefficiency. 
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most, a risk-based capital standard would reveal 
only whether or not a bank met the standard. 
One could not even infer that a bank adding cap- 
ital was doing so because it had become exces- 
sively risky; the extra capital might be needed 
because of anticipated expansion, etc. However, 
it would be very difficult to keep a bank's insur- 
ance premium confidential. Low-risk banks 
would have an incentive to advertise this fact and 
investors would have incentives to identify high- 
risk banks. This might cause particular problems 
in the use of confidential data to calculate premi- 
ums. Knowledge of a bank's premium could be 
used to draw strong inferences about values of 
any confidential inputs used. To the extent that 
this would deter the use of confidential data in a 
risk-based premium system, it might mean that 
risk assessment with a risk-based capital system 
would be more accurate and therefore fairer. 
Moreover, even if  confidential data 
were not used, public disclosure of a bank's pre- 
mium might create the possibility of bank runs. 
The official declaration of the FDIC that a bank 
was risky, even if  based on a mechanical calcula- 
tion from publicly available balance sheet data, 
might be sufficient to induce significant 
withdrawals. 
Yet another difference between the 
two methods is likely to occur in the regulatory 
response lag. Because it is based on a standard, a 
risk-based capital system may have a built-in 
response lag that is not present with a risk-based 
premium system. Under a risk-based premium 
system, a bank could be required to compensate 
the FDIC immediately for its risk exposure. In 
contrast, particularly if it entails raising new capi- 
tal, adherence to a capital standard would likely 
entail some lag, thereby delaying the ability of 
the insurer to control its risk exposure. 
Finally, even if the FDIC's assess- 
ment rate were adjusted so that it bore equivalent 
actuarial risk, there may be some differences in 
the number of bank failures under the two sys- 
tems. Either system should reduce the number of 
bank failures from current levels because of the 
reduced risk-taking that should result when banks 
are required to bear the full costs of their risk- 
taking? The magnitude of this reduction, how- 
ever, may differ for the two systems. As noted ear- 
lier, risk-based deposit insurance systems allow 
banks the flexibility of holding capital levels 
below those required under a comparable risk- 
based capital system and of offsetting the higher 
risk by paying larger insurance premiums. For 
those banks that opt to hold capital levels below 
those required under a capital standard and pay 
correspondingly larger insurance premiums, the 
incidence of failure would be higher under a risk- 
based insurance system than that observed under 
a risk-based capital standard. 
By the same token, a risk-based 
insurance system would provide other banks the 
flexibility of holding capital levels well above 
those required under a risk-based capital standard 
and of being compensated for this increased capi- 
tal by paying lower insurance premiums. For 
such banks, the incidence of failure will be lower 
under a risk-based insurance system than under a 
capital standard. This difference between the two 
systems stems from the fact that a capital standard 
does not reward banks for having capital greater 
than the minimum standard; a risk-based insur- 
ance system provides such a reward in the form 
of a reduced premium. 
The foregoing analysis suggests 
that, in the aggregate, it is unclear which of the 
two systems would reduce bank failures by the 
greatest amount. Prediction of whether an indi- 
vidual bank's capital would be greater under a 
risk-based capital standard than under a risk- 
based premium system depends on the cost of 
capital faced by the bank and upon the degree to 
which the risk-based insurance system penalizes 
banks for reductions in their capital. When the 
cost of raising capital in the private market (or 
other adjustment methods) is high relative to the 
penalty rate charged by the deposit insurer for 
reductions in capital, banks will be more likely to 
choose lower capital levels under a risk-based 
insurance scheme than that required under a risk- 
based capital standard. Conversely, when the insur- 
ance system assigns a relatively steep penalty rate 
for reductions in bank capital, individual banks 
would be more likely to hold larger amounts of 
capital under a risk-based insurance system, 
implying  a  lower  incidence  of  bank  failure. 
Despite these differences, if  based 
on the same method of assessing bank risk, 
proposals for risk-based capital and risk-based 
insurance should have a similar impact on bank 
risk-taking.  To provide a glimpse as to how such 
proposals might work, a practical system of risk- 
based deposit insurance and risk-based capital is 
developed and presented in the next section. 
Both proposals are based on the same method of 
9 
Some critics have charged that a risk-based capital or deposit 
insurance system might actually increase failures and incentives 
for risk-taking because regulators would measure risk poorly or  misprice 
it. While this may be  true, it should be pointed out that the current sys- 
tem assumes all banks represent the same risk. The  relevant question, 
therefore, is not whether regulators would do a perfect job, but whether 
they could differentiate among banks at all. 
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index forms the basis of both our risk-based capi- 
Sample Variable Statistics  tal and risk-based deposit insurance proposals. 
Means of  In selecting data used in this study 
Variable  Means of Failed Banks  Nonfailed Banks  for both estimation and model evaluations, the 
ICTA  6.14  9.26  following specific procedures were used. The 
PD90MA  3.41  0.77  sample was restricted to insured commercial 
LNNACCA  3.64  0.57  banks headquartered in the United States. Mutual 
RENEGA  0.28  0.07  savings banks were excluded. Microdata were col- 
NCOFSA  2.89  0.43  lected for each bank for each of the five semian- 
NETINCA  -2.94  0.90  nual call and income reports filed from Decem- 
ber 1982 through December 1984." 
Source: Board  of Governors of the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
TABLE  3 
assessing bank risk. As this represents only part of 
an on-going effort to develop such systems, we 
only briefly summarize our work."J 
11.  A Model of Bank  Risk 
Both the risk-based capital and risk-based insur- 
ance premium proposals require an accurate 
method of assessing bank risk. Forming an index 
or rank ordering of banks by risk entails two 
steps. First, variables must be selected that are 
good predictors of risk; and second, weights must 
be calculated to transform values of the vector of 
predictor variables into a single-valued index. 
Development of a good index is a 
substantial task and is well beyond the scope of 
this paper. It was decided somewhat arbitrarily, 
therefore, to use the same six predictor variables 
used by the FDIC in its risk-based insurance pro- 
posal (see table 1). One good method of forming 
weights for the index is to use historical data to 
"fit" values of the predictor variables to an observ- 
able ex-post measure of loss. Candidates for ex- 
post measures of bank performance might be 
bank failure and FDIC losses when failure occurs, 
or bank earnings or loan charge-offs. Although we 
use other measures of bank performance in other 
work, for the illustrative proposals developed for 
this paper it was decided to utilize bank failure. 
The basic strategy followed was to use historical 
data on bank failure to estimate weights that 
could be used to transform values of the six vari- 
ables listed in table 1 into an index of risk. This 
......................................... 
10 
See Robert B.  Avery and Gerald A. Hanweck, "A Dynamic 
Analysis of  Bank Failures," Proceedings of a Conference on 
Bank Structure and Competition (1984), Federal Reserve Bank of  Chi- 
cago; Robert A.  Avery, Gerald A. Hanweck and Myron L. Kwast, "An 
Analysis of  Risk-Based Deposit Insurance for Commercial Banks," Pro- 
ceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (19851, 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Chicago; and Terrence M.  Belton. "Risk-Based 
Capital Standards for  Commercial Banks," presented at the Federal 
Reserve System Conference on Banking and Financial Structure, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, September 1420, 1985. 
Each of the "calls" represented a 
potential observation with the following adjust- 
ments (thus each bank could appear in the sam- 
ple five times). Because new banks are thought 
to follow a different behavioral process, all calls 
were eliminated whenever a bank had not been 
in continuous existence for three years at that 
point. Banks without assets, deposits, or loans 
were also eliminated. The sample was further 
reduced by eliminating all banks with assets 
above $1 billion (approximately two percent of 
all banks) because of the virtual absence of large 
bank failures.12 These adjustments reduced the 
banks available in December 1984, for example, 
kom 14,460 to 13,388. The actual estimation 
sample was further reduced by only using 10 
percent (randomly selected) of the calls reported 
by banks that did not fail within a year of the call. 
This stratification of the nonfailed 
banks (which was corrected for in the estimation 
procedure) was done to create an estimation 
data-set of manageable size. All calls where the 
bank failed within a year of the call were used 
(thus a failed bank could contribute two calls to 
the sample). The final estimation sample con- 
sisted of 6,869 observations, 160 of which repres- 
ented calls for banks that failed within six months 
of the call and 138 for banks that failed between 
six months and a year after the call. 
The data used for the study were 
taken directly from the bank's filed call report, 
with slight adjustment. June values for the two 
income variables-charge-offs  and net income- 
were recalculated to reflect performance over the 
previous year rather than the 6-month period 
reported. Means of the variables for the estima- 
tion data are given in table 3. The data were fit 
using a logistic model to predict bank failure 
......................................... 
More time periods could have been used. However, it was  1  1  decided to limit the length of the estimation period so that an 
"out of  sample" measure of  the model's performance could be 
computed. 
The elimination of large banks had virtually no effect on the  1  1  2  results, 
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where a bank was deemed to have failed if  it 
failed within a year following the call. The esti- 
mated risk index is: 
where the logistic form of  the model implies that 
the probability that a bank will fail within a year is, 
(3a)  PROB =  1 
~-w(-R) 
T-statistics for the estimated coefficients are given 
in parenthesis under each weight.'3  All  weights 
are statistically significant except those for NCOFSA 
(which has a perverse sign) and RENEGA1* 
Although the overall fit of the mod- 
el suggests that predicting bank failure is difficult, 
the failed banks in the sample had an average pre- 
dicted probability of failure of 0.24, a number 69 
times larger than the average predicted failure 
probability of nonfailed banks in the sample. 
Hence, the model clearly does have some ability 
to discriminate between high- and low-risk banks. 
111.  Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums 
Several somewhat arbitrary assumptions were 
used to convert the estimated risk-assessment 
model into a risk-based deposit insurance pre- 
mium system. First, the FDIC's expected cost of 
Coefficients for a logistic model have a less straightforward 
interpretation that those in regression models. When multi- 
plied by PROB  (1-PROB) each coefficient represents the expected 
change in the probability of failure resulting from a one-unit change in 
the variable.  Thus, if a bank with a probability of failure of 0.1  raised its 
capital ratio one percentage point, the model implies that its probability 
of failure would fall by ,045,  that is, ( -SO1 x .1 x .9).  Although they 
were estimated using the same variables, and with data drawn from 
similar time periods, the coefficients in (3) differ somewhat from those in 
(1).  This occurs, in part, because the FDlC model was estimated using a 
probit rather than logistic specification, which effects the scaling of the 
variables (logistic coefficients should be approximately 1.8 times as 
large). It also stems from the fact that the FDlC used problem-bank sta- 
tus rather than bank failure as a dependent variable. 
14 
The model's log-likelihood R squared, a concept similar to the 
R squared in a regression model, is 0.22.  The  sign on the 
weight of NCOFSA may be not be as perverse as it appears. The coeffi- 
cient on charge-offs represents the marginal impact on failure holding net 
income constant. Because charge-offs  are also in net income, they are 
effectively counted twice. The positive sign on charge-offs indicates they 
have less impact on failure than other contributory factors toward eam- 
ings. The  total impact of charge-offs (the sum of the coefficients of 
NCOFSA and NETINC) has the expected negative sign. 
insuring each bank (per-dollar of deposits) was 
computed as the estimated probability of  failure 
(from the formula in  [31) times the average FDIC 
loss when failure occurs (13.6 cents/ per dol- 
lar).l5 Assessment of this premium, which aver- 
aged 7.2 basis points per dollar of deposits in 
December 1985, would be actuarially fair if there 
were no monitoring or social costs. Since these 
factors are not known, and to provide compm- 
bility with the current system, an intercept (or flat 
premium) of 1.1 basis points per dollar of depos- 
its was added to the risk-based assessment so that 
the total assessment would be equivalent to the 
FDIC's actual revenues as of December 1985 
(with the current flat-rate assessment of 8.3 basis 
points). While certainly not a necessary ingre- 
dient of a risk-based system, the FDIC revenue 
constraint was adopted in order to allow the con- 
centration of effort and discussion on estimating 
the risk-based component of the premium while 
not having to address the issue of what the 
appropriate level of gross revenues should be. 
Finally premiums were "capped at 100 basis 
points because of the belief that premiums above 
this level would be difficult to collect. 
Estimates of December 1985 risk- 
based premiums under this system are presented 
in table 4. Premiums are computed across seven 
asset-size classes of  banks (rows [I]  through [7]  ) 
and six premium-size intervals (columns [I] 
through [6]  ). It should be emphasized that while 
premiums for banks with over $1 billion in assets 
are computed and reported, these are extrapola- 
tions as no banks.of this size were included in 
the sample used to estimate the risk index. Rows 
(8) and (9) show the premium distribution for 
banks that subsequently failed in 1986 and 1987 
(through September 30), giving an idea of the 
system's capacity to identify and penalize risky 
banks. Row (10) and column (7) present totals 
for all banks. The first number in each cell is the 
average risk-based premium expressed in basis 
points of total domestic deposits. The second 
number is the average estimated (percentage) 
probability of failure by banks in that cell, and the 
third figure is the number of banks, based on the 
total of 13,522 banks used to compute the pre- 
mium, that are predicted to fall into each size and 
risk-class category. 
The primaty conclusion to be drawn 
from table 4 is that the risk-based system 
depicted there would divide banks into three 
major groups. First, even with the FDIC revenue 
constraint imposed, the vast majority of  banks 
15 
This number is the average ratio of the FDIC's loss reserve 
to total domestic deposits calculated for banks that failed 
between 1981 and 1984.  See  Avery, Hanweck, and Kwast "An Analysis 
of Risk-based Deposit Insurance." 
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Estimated Commercial Bank Risk-based Premiums -  December 1985 
(Basis Points of Total Domestic Deposits) 
First number is the average premium for banks in the cell. Second number is average estimated probability of failure in percent. Third 
number is number of banks. 
Asset Size Class  Premium Size Class 
(%  millions) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
< 8.3  8.3-12.4  12.5-24  25-49  50-99  100  All Banks 
(1)  <  $10  2.4  10.1  17.2  32.1  61.6  100.0  6.3 
.1  .6  1.2  2.3  4.5  34.5  1.1 
933.0  29.0  23.0  16.0  9.0  25.0  1035.0 
(2)  $10  - $25  2.6  10.0  17.2  33.3  68.8  100.0  6.9 
.1  .7  1.2  2.4  5.0  42.7  1.2 
3135.0  109.0  131.0  61.0  44.0  78.0  3558.0 
(3)  $25  - $50  2.9  10.1  17.1  35.0  70.4  100.0  5.9 
.1  .7  1.2  2.5  5.1  33.6  .7 
3258.0  112.0  105.0  47.0  26.0  54.0  3602.0 
(4)  $50  - $100  3.1  9.9  16.8  33.9  74.3  100.0  5.9 
.2  .7  1.2  2.4  5.4  35.6  .7 
2485.0  116.0  72.0  29.0  19.0  36.0  2757.0 
(5)  $100  - $500  3.7  9.8  16.4  32.9  71.7  100.0  5.7 
.2  .6  1.1  2.3  5.2  71.1  .5 
1859.0  85.0  65.0  28.0  7.0  16.0  2060.0 
(6)  $500  - $1000  4.3  9.3  17.3  29.4  69.7  100.0  7.5  2 7 
.2  .6  1.2  2.1  5.0  54.8  .9 
171.0  14.0  9.0  3.0  3.0  2.0  202.0 
(7)  >  $1000  5.1  9.8  15.9  37.7  78.8  0.0  7.0 
.3  .6  1.1  2.7  5.7  0.0  .4 
230.0  60.0  15.0  2.0  1  .O  0.0  308.0 
(8)  Banks failing  4.8  10.8  17.1  38.1  71.5  100.0  68.7 
in 1986  .3  .7  1.2  2.7  5.2  51.8  30.1. 
17.0  8.0  9.0  12.0  12.0  75.0  133.0 
(9)  Banks failing  4.6  10.2  16.9  32.2  69.8  100.0  37.3 
in 1987  .3  .7  1.2  2.3  5.1  35.6  9.3 
44.0  11.0  20.0  17.0  9.0  31.0  132.0 
(10)  All Banks  3.0  9.9  16.9  33.6  69.8  100.0  6.2 
.1  .7  1.2  2.4  5.0  37.4  .8 
12071.0  525.0  420.0  186.0  109.0  211.0  13522.0 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
TABLE  4 
would pay a lower insurance premium under the 
estimated risk-based scheme than the current 
gross premium of 8.3 basis points. As may be 
seen from the table, this is true for all size classes, 
with the proportion paying less ranging from a 
low of 75 percent to 90 percent. Overall, 89 per- 
cent of all institutions are estimated to pay less 
with an average premium of 3.0 basis points. 
The second group of banks is com- 
posed of the 9 percent of all banks that would 
pay an increased premium ranging from a low of 
8.3 basis points to 99 basis points (columns 2 
through 5). This range of almost 92  basis points 
is quite large and appears wide enough both to 
provide a strong incentive to alter current risk- 
taking behavior by banks and to deter excessive 
risk-taking in the future. Some perspective on the 
size of the estimated risk-based premium is given 
by noting that the average bank's return on total 
deposits in 1985 was only 82 basis points. The 
average bank's premium would have been almost 
1 percent of its previous year's total capital, and 
somewhat over 4 percent of its net income. But 
in the higher risk categories (columns 4-6), the 
capital percentages range up to 25.5 percent. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Best available copyECONOMIC  REVIEW 
The third group of banks is the one 
percent that would have been asked to pay an 
insurance premium of over one percent (capped 
at 100 basis points) of  total domestic deposits in 
1985 (column 6 of table 4). For these banks it is 
not unusual for the average expected cost imposed 
on the FDIC to exceed 500 basis points. Indeed, 
the total cost that would have been expected to 
be imposed on the FDIC in 1986 by the 211 
banks in column 6 was $477 million, or 25 per- 
cent of the total expected cost of $1.9 billion for 
all 13,522 commercial banks for which premiums 
were computed. Clearly, because the size of  the 
assessment might be sufficient, by itself, to force 
these banks into insolvency, special measures 
might be needed to deal with them. 
The ability of  the system to identify 
risky banks in advance is illustrated by the pre- 
miums that would have been charged in Decem- 
ber 1985 to banks that subsequently have failed. 
Over 87 percent of the banks that failed in 1986 
would have been required to pay higher premi- 
ums than they pay currently, a figure in sharp con- 
trast to the overall figure of 11 percent. Over one- 
half of the 1986 failed banks would have been 
assessed premiums at the highest rate of 100 basis 
points. Figures for banks that failed in 1987 are 
somewhat less dramatic. Still, 67 percent of 1987 
failed banks would have been required to pay 
higher premiums in 1985, and almost one-fourth 
would have been placed in the highest risk class. 
IV.  Risk-based Capital 
Conversion of the bank failure model estimates 
into a risk-based capital system was somewhat 
more complicated than procedures used for the 
risk-based insurance premium system. To ensure 
comparability with the current system, it was 
decided to set a standard so that if all banks held 
exactly the required capital ratio, the expected 
losses to the FDIC would be identical to its 
expected losses under the current system. It was 
determined that this would occur if each bank in 
December 1985 were required to hold enough cap- 
ital so that its probability of failure was 0.7 per- 
cent (about 95 expected bank failures per year). 
A floor and ceiling were also im- 
posed so that no bank would be required to have 
a capital ratio of less than 3 percent nor more 
than 15 percent. This particular standard was 
chosen in order to make the expected losses to 
the FDIC of the risk-based capital system as close 
as possible to the risk-based insurance system out- 
lined in the previous section. Imposition of the 3 
percent minimum floor was similar to the addition 
of an intercept term in the risk-based premium 
system, and is a tacit admission that any realistic 
risk-based capital system would have to have a 
floor. The 15 maximum capital standard is similar 
to the cap imposed on the risk-based premium. 
Solution for the amount of capital 
each bank would have to hold follows straight- 
forwardly fi-om the estimated risk index. The for- 
mula given in equation (3a) implies that a bank 
with a risk index value of -4.95 would have a 
probability of failure of precisely 0.7 percent. 
Equation (3), therefore, implies that the required 
minimum capital level, KTA:  must satisfy 
(4)  -4.95 = -2.42 - .5OlKTA*+ .428PD90MA+ 
314  LNNACCA + .269 RENEGA - 
.223NCOFSA- .331  NETINCA , 
or, 
(5)  KTA*= 5.04 + .854PD9O MA+ 
.627LNNACCA + .537RENEGA - 
.445NCOFSA- .661  NETINCA , 
which can be solved for each bank.16 
Table 5 gives an indication as to 
how a risk-based capital system might work. It 
shows the December 1985 distribution of 
required capital by bank-size class and future 
failure. Rows (1) through (7) represent banks of 
increasing size, row (8) shows banks that failed 
in 1986, row (9) shows banks that failed in 1987 
(through September 30), and row (10) shows the 
sum of all banks. The columns show the number 
and percent of banks in each size class that 
would have been assigned to various required 
capital classes. For each cell, the first number 
given is the average required capital level for 
banks in the cell, the second number is the per- 
centage of  banks that would have to raise capital 
to meet the new standard, and the third number 
is the number of banks in the cell. 
The numbers in table 5 suggest 
several interesting conclusions. Eighty-six percent 
of all banks would have a risk-based capital 
assessment below 6.5 percent. A middle group 
would be required to hold capital ratios between 
6.5 and 10 percent; and a small group (3.4 per- 
cent of the total) would have to hold capital of 
over 10 percent of assets. There is an indication 
that banks with higher risk already hold more 
capital than required. Thus, almost 92 percent of 
banks would not have to raise more capital under 
the risk-based standard. However, there is a small 
......................................... 
16 
The  formula implies that a bank would reduce its index value 
by 0.501 for each percentage point rise in its capital ratio. 
Thus.  a bank with a 5.5 percent capital ratio and a risk index of -3.70 
would be required to raise its capital ratio 2.5  percentage points to 8 
percent, that is 2.5 = [4.95  - 3.7111.501.  Banks with risk indices below 
-4.95 would be allowed to divest one percentage point of capital for 
each 0.501 they were below -4.95. 
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Estimated Commercial Bank Risk-based Required Capital -  December 1985 
(Percent of total assets) 
First number is the average capital ratio for banks in the cell. Second number is percent of banks that would have to raise capital. Third 
number is number of banks. 
Asset Size Class  Required Capital Class 
(S millions)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
< 5.5  5.5-6.4  6.5-7.4  7.5-9.9  10.0-14.9  15.0  All Banks 
(8)  Banks failing  4.6  5.9  7.1  9.0  12.4  15.0  11.5 
in 1986  0.0  33.3  53.3  86.4  98.1  100.0  86.5 
5.0  3.0  15.0  22.0  54.0  34.0  133.0 
(9)  Banks failing  5.0  6.0  6.8  8.8  12.1  15.0  9.2 
in 1987  9.1  16.7  21.0  75.5  96.7  72.7  61.4 
11.0  12.0  19.0  49.0  30.0  11.0  132.0 
(10)  All Banks  4.8  5.9  6.9  8.4  11.7  15.0  5.7 
.3  2.9  13.7  51.1  91.7  94.9  8.8 
8069.0  2815.0  1212.0  972.0  375.0  79.0  13522.0 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
TABLE  5 
group that would have to raise a substantial 
amount of additional capital. The efficiency of a 
risk-based system is evident from the fact that 
aggregate bank capital would be reduced by 18 
percent from the actual December 1985 total, yet 
expected FDIC losses would be exactly the same 
as under the current system. This happens 
because the risk-based system shifts capital to 
those banks most likely to fail. 
The evidence of the banks that 
failed in 1986 and 1987 is particularly telling. All 
but 18 of the 133 banks that failed in 1986 would 
have been required to raise additional capital in 
December 1985. As a group, these banks would 
have been required to almost double their aggre- 
gate capital. Over 60 percent of the banks that 
failed in 1987 would have been required to raise 
additional capital and over 90 percent would 
have been assigned a capital ratio above the cur- 
rent standard. 
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V.  Final Comments 
The systems presented here are meant to be illus- 
trative and would probably require substantial 
modification before they could be actually imple- 
mented. They do  show, however, that both risk- 
based capital and risk-based insurance systems 
could be constructed that discriminate between 
banks in a way that would likely affect behavior. 
The similarities between the dis- 
tribution of banks shown in the tables summariz- 
ing the proposals is striking. This, however, 
should not be surprising since both systems are 
based on the same risk measure. Indeed, if  we 
had arrayed banks by the amount of new capital 
they would have to raise, instead of by required 
levels, the rank orderings of  banks in the two sys- 
tems would have been identical. They differ in 
the arrangements shown only because some 
banks that would otherwise have higher risk hold 
more capital than required under the current sys- 
tem, and thus, would reduce their premiums. 
This does not mean that the two 
systems would have identical impacts on bank 
behavior or on overall system risk As argued ear- 
lier, the regulatory environment surrounding 
each system is likely to differ. If  banks face prices 
for risk in the capital market different fiom those 
charged by the FDIC, there will be inefficiencies 
in a risk-based capital standard that could pro- 
duce different levels of system risk. 
The incentives for banks to alter 
their risk-taking activities are very likely to differ 
between the two systems. It is not clear, however, 
that the impact of such differences would be 
major. Both systems share a common basis in the 
principle of differentially regulating banks accord- 
ing to the risk they represent to society. Imple- 
mentation of either type of system is likely to 
lead to significant progress in the battle to control 
bank risk. 
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